

Contagion and Equilibria in Diversified Financial Networks


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
conduits
resilience



Challenges

Modelling diversification:

topological modelling: diversification captured by degree distribution



Absence of analytical closed form for equilibrium firm valuations:

focus on specific topologies

Firm valuation a non-linear function:

multiple equilibria

Model

Valuation

endowment

cross-shareholdings

default costs

Elliott, Golub, Jackson (2014)

n firms

$V_i :=$ valuation of firm i

$$\mathbf{V} = (V_i)$$

$e_i :=$ *endowment* of firm i

$$\mathbf{e} = (e_i)$$

$C_{ij} :=$ share of firm j held by firm i

$$\mathbf{C} = [C_{ij}]$$

$1 > C_{1j} + \dots + C_{nj} =: c_j$ *exposure* of firm j

$\tau :=$ insolvency threshold

$$\mathbb{1}_{\{V_i \leq \tau\}} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } V_i \leq \tau, \\ 0 & \text{if } V_i > \tau. \end{cases}$$

$$\mathbb{1}_{\{\mathbf{V} \leq \tau \mathbf{1}\}}$$

$\beta :=$ default cost

Equilibria

$$V_i = e_i + \sum_{j=1}^n C_{ij} V_j - \beta \mathbf{1}_{\{V_i \leq \tau\}}$$

$$\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{e} + \mathbf{C}\mathbf{V} - \beta \mathbf{1}_{\{\mathbf{V} \leq \tau \mathbf{1}\}}$$

The annoying sub-text: “book” versus “market” valuations

$$\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{V}_{\text{book}}$$

$$\mathbf{V}_{\text{market}} = \text{diag}(1 - c_1, \dots, 1 - c_n) \mathbf{V}_{\text{book}}$$

No interpretable analytical solutions except in special, very regular cases

Multiple equilibria

compact lattice

maximal and minimal equilibria

Putative and feasible equilibria

$$\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{e} + \mathbf{C}\mathbf{V} - \beta \mathbf{1}_{\{\mathbf{V} \leq \tau \mathbf{1}\}}$$

Putative solvency indicators

$$\mathbf{k} = (k_1, \dots, k_n)^\top \in \{0, 1\}^n$$


Orthants

The orthant $\mathbb{K}^n(\mathbf{k})$ consists of points $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)^\top$ in \mathbb{R}^n satisfying $x_i > \tau$ if $k_i = 1$ and $x_i \leq \tau$ if $k_i = 0$.

Putative equilibria

$$\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{e} + \mathbf{C}\mathbf{V} - \beta(\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{k})$$

A putative equilibrium $\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{V}(\mathbf{k})$ is **feasible** (for a putative solvency indicator \mathbf{k}) if, and only if, $\mathbf{V}(\mathbf{k}) \in \mathbb{K}^n(\mathbf{k})$.



Algebraic simplifications:


common endowment

$$e = e\mathbf{1} = e(1, \dots, 1)^\top$$

common exposure


$$C = cX = c [X_1 \quad \dots \quad X_n]$$

column stochastic matrix



non-linear fixed-point equation

$$V = e\mathbf{1} + cXV - \beta \mathbf{1}_{\{V \leq \tau \mathbf{1}\}}$$



putative linear fixed-point equations

$$V = e\mathbf{1} + cXV - \beta(1 - \mathbf{k}) \quad (\mathbf{k} \in \{0, 1\}^n)$$

feasible if, and only if, $V = V(\mathbf{k}) \in \mathbb{K}^n(\mathbf{k})$


Our story in a **slogan**:

If, for any given **exposure**, the **endowment** reaches a critical level,
then *almost all* diversified networks are resilient to shocks and contagion.

Structure via randomisation

$$V = e\mathbf{1} + c\mathbf{X}V - \beta(1 - \mathbf{k})$$

column stochastic: available share distribution



Random cross-shareholding matrices

$$\mathbf{C} = c [\mathbf{X}_1 \quad \mathbf{X}_2 \quad \cdots \quad \mathbf{X}_n] \quad \mathbf{X}_j = \begin{pmatrix} X_{1j} \\ \vdots \\ X_{nj} \end{pmatrix} \quad |\mathbf{X}_j| = X_{1j} + \cdots + X_{nj} = 1$$

Modelling diversification

Shares for each firm j are *exchangeable* random variables with column sum the common exposure c
Shares across firms are independent


Encoding structure

Properties of distribution encode structure
Graph topology [degree, diameter, centrality] not immediately relevant

The de Finetti spacings

archetypal exchangeable system

$$\mathbf{X} = \begin{pmatrix} X_1 \\ \vdots \\ X_n \end{pmatrix}$$



$$\mathbf{P}\{X_1 > x_1, \dots, X_n > x_n\} = [(1 - x_1 - \dots - x_n)_+]^{n-1}$$

$$\mathbf{E}(X_i) = \frac{1}{n}$$

$$\text{Var}(X_i) = \frac{n-1}{n^2(n+1)} \sim \frac{1}{n^2}$$


$$\text{Cov}(X_i, X_j) = \frac{-1}{n^2(n+1)}$$

$$\left\| X_i - \frac{1}{n} \right\|_p = \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)$$



capturing full diversification

negatively correlated,
weak asymptotic dependence




Coordinate spacings

pathological exchangeable system

$$\mathbf{X} = \begin{pmatrix} X_1 \\ \vdots \\ X_n \end{pmatrix}$$

The distribution $F_n(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ of the spacings is atomic and places equal mass on each of the atoms $(1, 0, \dots, 0)$, $(0, 1, \dots, 0)$, and $(0, 0, \dots, 1)$.



$$X_i \sim \text{Bernoulli}(n^{-1})$$

$$\mathbb{E}(X_i) = \frac{1}{n}$$

$$\text{Var}(X_i) = \frac{1}{n} \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right) \sim \frac{1}{n}$$

$$\left\| X_i - \frac{1}{n} \right\|_p = \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{n^{\frac{1}{p}}}\right)$$

dependency structure

$$\text{Cov}(X_i, X_j) = -\frac{1}{n^2}$$

Asymptotically diffuse distributions

the essence of diversification

$$\mathbf{x}^{(n)} = \mathbf{x} = \begin{pmatrix} X_1 \\ \vdots \\ X_n \end{pmatrix}$$

spacings of the unit interval

$$X_i \geq 0 \quad X_1 + \cdots + X_n = 1$$

exchangeable components

$$F_n(\mathbf{x}) = F_n(\Pi\mathbf{x}) \quad (\text{all permutations } \Pi\mathbf{x} = (\Pi x_1, \dots, \Pi x_n))$$

$$\mathbf{E}(X_i) = \frac{1}{n}$$

asymptotically diffuse condition

$$\left\| X_i - \frac{1}{n} \right\|_g = o\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)$$

Equilibria for a random matrix

$$\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{e}\mathbf{1} + \mathbf{C}\mathbf{V} - \beta(\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{k})$$

Random matrix

$$\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{C}^{(n)} = c \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{X}_1^{(n)} & \mathbf{X}_2^{(n)} & \dots & \mathbf{X}_n^{(n)} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\text{column } \mathbf{X}_j^{(n)} = (X_{1j}^{(n)}, \dots, X_{nj}^{(n)})^\top$$

components: non-negative valued, exchangeable, asymptotically diffuse


$$\mathbf{E}(X_{ij}^{(n)}) = \frac{1}{n}$$

columns $\mathbf{X}_1^{(n)}, \dots, \mathbf{X}_n^{(n)}$: independent, identically distributed

Putative equilibria

$$\mathbf{V}^{(n)}(\mathbf{k}^{(n)}) = \mathbf{V}(\mathbf{k}) = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{C})^{-1} ((\mathbf{e} - \beta)\mathbf{1} + \beta\mathbf{k}) \quad (\mathbf{k}^{(n)} = \mathbf{k} \in \{0, 1\}^n)$$

feasible if, and only if, $\mathbf{V}(\mathbf{k}) \in \mathbb{K}^n(\mathbf{k})$



Candidate equilibria

$$\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{e}\mathbf{1} + \mathbf{C}\mathbf{V} - \beta(\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{k})$$

The **regular clique**

$$\bar{\mathbf{C}}^{(n)} = \bar{\mathbf{C}} := \frac{c}{n} \mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}^\top = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{c}{n} & \cdots & \frac{c}{n} \\ \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\ \frac{c}{n} & \cdots & \frac{c}{n} \end{bmatrix}$$


Putative equilibria

$$\bar{\mathbf{V}}^{(n)}(\mathbf{k}^{(n)}) = \bar{\mathbf{V}}(\mathbf{k}) = (\mathbf{I} - \bar{\mathbf{C}})^{-1} ((\mathbf{e} - \beta)\mathbf{1} + \beta\mathbf{k}) \quad (\mathbf{k}^{(n)} = \mathbf{k} \in \{0, 1\}^n)$$

feasible if, and only if, $\bar{\mathbf{V}}(\mathbf{k}) \in \mathbb{K}^n(\mathbf{k})$

explicit solutions

equivalence classes of solvency orthants determined upto permutations by $|\mathbf{k}|$



Concentration


$$\mathbf{V}^{(n)}(\mathbf{k}^{(n)}) = \mathbf{V}(\mathbf{k}) = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{C})^{-1} ((\mathbf{e} - \beta)\mathbf{1} + \beta\mathbf{k})$$

random cross-shareholding matrix

$$\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{C}^{(n)} = c \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{X}_1^{(n)} & \mathbf{X}_2^{(n)} & \cdots & \mathbf{X}_n^{(n)} \end{bmatrix}$$

regular clique

$$\bar{\mathbf{C}}^{(n)} = \bar{\mathbf{C}} := \frac{c}{n} \mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}^\top = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{c}{n} & \cdots & \frac{c}{n} \\ \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\ \frac{c}{n} & \cdots & \frac{c}{n} \end{bmatrix}$$




Theorem For any sequence of index vectors $\{ \mathbf{k}^{(n)} \in \{0, 1\}^n, n \geq 1 \}$, we have

$$\sup_{1 \leq i \leq n} |V_i^{(n)}(\mathbf{k}^{(n)}) - \bar{V}_i^{(n)}(\mathbf{k}^{(n)})| \rightarrow 0$$


almost surely as $n \rightarrow \infty$.

Slogan





The putative equilibria (*a fortiori* the feasible equilibria) of the random cross-shareholding matrix \mathbf{C} are everywhere close to the corresponding equilibria of the regular clique $\overline{\mathbf{C}}$.



Feasibility regions for the regular clique



equivalence classes of orthants parametrised by number of putatively solvent firms



Response to shocks

Fictitious dynamic

$$\mathbf{V}_{t+1} = \mathbf{e} + \mathbf{C}\mathbf{V}_t - \beta \mathbb{1}_{\{v_t \leq \tau\}}$$

Valuation shock


starting from the best (maximal) equilibrium suppose $n - k$ firms become insolvent

Fixed exposure: if the endowment is at or above a *critical value* then full recovery is assured

Fixed endowment: stability improves as exposure increases

Our story in a **slogan**:

If, for any given **exposure**, the **endowment** reaches a critical level, then *almost all* diversified networks are resilient to shocks and contagion.



Quo vadis?

Extensions

Folding in topological graph structure

Erdős–Rényi digraphs $G_{n,p}$: out-degree of vertex j determines firms who hold shares in firm j 's equity

Random matrix allocation: given exposure c , allocate j 's shares via an asymptotically diffuse exchangeable process

Topological regular clique: assign shares equally to all j 's neighbours

Multi-type random graphs, stochastic block models

Core-periphery networks, cross-border relations

Almost all instances of the topological random share matrix behave like the topological regular clique

No sensitivity to diversification, even for very small p

But we have no results in the *very* sparse domain when $d = np = \mathcal{O}(1)$ is small

Graphons, optimal bailouts [with Krishna Dasaratha and Rakesh Vohra]

